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This paper aims to investigate whether audit committees with certain characteristics 
effectively avoid initial year audit fee discounts or so called ‘low-balling.’ Effective audit 
committees may not be attracted with auditor’s fee cutting in the initial engagement year to 
maintain high quality of audit. We classify audit committee based on four aspects that 
signify the quality of the committee: independence, financial expertise, meeting frequency, 
and tenure. Consistent with prior research, we findlow-balling of audit fees exist in 
Korean audit market and audit committee independence and meeting frequency are 
positively associated with audit fees. In particular, udit committees with frequent 
meetings prevent audit fee discounts in the first engagement year, suggesting that diligent 
audit committee plays an important role to maintain high audit quality. Finally, we find 
that the audit committees which satisfy at least one f good governance criteria are 
effective in preventing initial year audit fee discounts. Sensitivity analyses also reveal that 
audit committee expertise is also weakly related to higher audit fees.  
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This paper investigates how the audit committee characteristics measured by 
independence, financial expertise, meeting frequency (i.e., activity) and average tenure of 
audit committee members, impact the magnitude of auditors’ initial engagement year audit 
fee discounts or low-balling of audit fees. Experiencing high-profile financial fraud cases 
such as Enron, regulators and publics have had increased concerns about corporate 
governance and the quality of financial reporting (National Association of Corporate 
Directors, NACD 2000; DeFond et al. 2005; Prawitt e al. 2012). Among many 
mechanisms in a company that are established to reduce agency problems, boards of 
directors assume an important role in corporate governance. Boards exist to protect the 
interests of the shareholders (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983). To achieve its objective, 
board of directors performs an oversight role that involves monitoring top executives 
including the CEO, approving the company’s strategies, and maintaining the control 
system (DeZoort et al. 2002). Due to its diverse responsibilities, the board of directors 
delegates some of its oversight to the audit committee and other committees of the board. 
The audit committee mainly oversees the processes which relate to the company’s 
financial risks, that is, the oversight of financial reporting, internal controls to address key 
risks, and audit-related activities (DeZoort et al. 2002).  
As one way to achieve its roles and responsibilities, the audit committee selects and 
changes an external auditor. In fact, the Blue Ribbon Committee’s (BRC, 1999) report, 
Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees, clearly states the role and 
responsibility of the audit committee on selection, evaluation and replacement of an 
external auditor.1  As audit committee members value their reputation and financial 
                                                            
1 The BRC recommendation was extended by Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) which assigns 
direct responsibility for determining the external auditor’s compensation to the audit committee 
(Beck and Mauldin 2014). 
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statements-related risks rely heavily on the audit committee’s overseeing ability, it is 
critical for the audit committee to select and change an external auditor who provides high 
quality of audit services (Reinstein et al. 1984). DeAngelo (1981) defines the quality of 
audit services as the market assessed joint probability that a given external auditor will 
both (1) discover a breach in the company's accounting system, and (2) report the breach. 
The former and the latter depend upon audit procedures and the auditor's independence 
from a company, respectively. With respect to the former factor, the ability of the auditor 
to uncover failures in the client’s accounting system will depend on the auditor being free 
to determine appropriate audit techniques and the ext nt of their application (DeAngelo 
1981). These suggest that the audit work should not be constrained by the size of audit fees 
but rather should be based on the judgment on what is necessary to arrive at an adequate 
audit opinion (Collier and Gregory 1996). However, in practice, if audit fee is too low, it is 
possible that auditor do not exert enough audit effort to save audit costs, thereby lowering 
audit quality.  
In regards to low-balling of audit fees at initial audit engagement stage, DeAngelo (1981) 
argues that certain aspects of an audit environment such as significant transactions costs of 
changing an external auditor enable the incumbent auditor to have relatively strong 
bargaining power and in turn earn quasi-rents on future audits of a given client, and thus 
auditors try to attract clients to extract quasi-rents by cutting audit fees below total costs in 
the initial year. In fact, many prior studies show that the existence of initial year audit fee 
discounts in many different countries (e.g., Simon and Francis 1988; Ghosh and Lustgarten 
2006; Shin et al. 2007).  
Due to this importance of auditor selection by the audit committee, prior literature 
examines the link between audit committees, audit fees, and audit quality. For example, 
Collier and Gregory (1996) document the positive eff ct of the audit committee on audit 
fees, which suggests that the audit committee plays an important role in preventing audit 
fees from reducing to levels where audit quality may be compromised. Moreover, Abbott 
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et al. (2003) find audit fees are positively related o audit committee independence and 
financial expertise.  
However, higher audit fees do not always represent higher audit quality. Higher the 
audit fees, higher the possibility of the economic bonding between the auditor and the 
client (Choi et al. 2010).1  It is possible that the client pays high audit fees in return for the 
compromised auditor independence. Auditors may acquiesce to client pressure while 
receiving lucrative fees. Consistent with this prediction, both Choi et al. (2010) and 
Hoitash et al. (2007) find a negative association between abnormal audit fees and audit 
quality, supporting for the arguments that the economic bonding significantly influence 
auditor behavior. 
Thus, it is not clear from prior literature whether high or low fees are detrimental to the 
audit quality. Given the importance of auditor selection by the audit committee and the 
existence of low-balling practice in the audit market, we empirically test our hypotheses on 
the association between audit committee characteristics and low-balling of audit fees using 
a sample of 1,429 firm-year observations for the 2000-2012 periods in Korea. We expect 
that high quality audit committee plays a role in mitigating auditor low-balling. Although 
prior Korean studies examine the existence of low-balling (e.g., Shin et al. 2007; Park and 
Lee 2008; Park and Shim 2009; Park et al. 2010; Lee et al. 2011) or the audit fee effect of 
audit committees (e.g., Park and Shim 2009), none of the studies examine the issue 
combined together.  
The empirical findings of this study are summarized as follows. First, initial year audit 
fee discounting exists and audit fees are positively associated with audit committee 
independence and meeting frequency, consistent with Abbott et al. (2003) and Chung 
(2005). Second, diligent audit committees that meet frequently have less initial year audit 
fee discounts, suggesting that active audit committees restrict auditor low-balling to 
                                                            
1
 Specifically, Choi et al. (2010) find positive abnormal audit fees are negatively associated with 
audit quality while negative abnormal audit fees are not significantly associated with audit quality. 
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maintain high audit quality. Third, the audit committees which have at least one of good 
governance criteria (out of four characteristics mentioned previously) are effective in 
avoiding low-balling of audit fees, compared with the other firms without meeting any of 
good governance criteria. Finally, sensitivity analyses reveal weak evidence that audit 
committee expertise is also related to the reduced magnitude of low-balling. 
 Our study makes several contributions to academics, practitioners, and regulators. First, 
we contribute to the literature on the audit fee negotiation process by providing further 
empirical support for the existence of initial year audit fee discounts and subsequent audit 
fee increases, and investigating the effect of audit committee characteristics on the low-
balling of audit fees. Second, we add the literature on audit committee effectiveness by 
using a sample of firms with audit committees over a longer period of time and examining 
the role of audit committee characteristics in auditor remuneration. Thus, this study 
contributes to the audit-related academic literature. Third, the findings in this study provide 
interesting and valuable implications to practitioners and regulators by providing the 
condition that poor audit quality can be observed. Finally, given the long-standing 
concerns of regulators about corporate governance and the recent regulation on 
independent directors in Korean financial firms1, our results should be of interest to policy-
makers to reveal the effect of good governance mechanism.  
The rest of this study proceeds as follows. In Sections II and III, we review the related 
literature and develop our hypotheses, respectively. Section IV presents the research design 
and Section V describes the data and sample characteristi s. In Section VI, we discuss our 
empirical results. Finally, Section VII concludes. 
 
                                                            
1
 On November 20, 2014, Financial Services Commission released the Corporate Governance Code 
for financial companies whose asset size over 2 trillion won. According to the Code, the financial 
companies should secure the diversity of outside dir ctors’ expertise and tenure of outside 




II. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Theoretical Arguments on Low-balling of Audit Fees 
 
Theoretical models that describe the auditor-client vironment offer conflicting 
inferences about initial audit pricing and audit quality. First, DeAngelo (1981) argues that 
the existence of client specified quasi-rents to incumbent auditors leads to initial year low-
balling and lowers the optimal amount of auditor independence. Specifically, certain 
aspects of the audit environment such as significant tr sactions costs of changing auditors 
and technological advantages to incumbent auditors enable incumbent auditors to earn 
quasi-rents on future audits of a given client and these expected future quasi-rents drive 
fees below total costs in the initial period. If the auditor market is competitive, loss from 
initial year low-balling and quasi-rents from subsequ nt audit years are same so that the 
excess profit for the auditor is zero. Chan (1999) also demonstrates that auditors’ start-up 
costs and clients’ switching costs induce the practice of initial year audit fee discounting 
and that such practice is a natural result from competition among audit firms. But he 
argues that low-balling occurs only where audit firms compete fiercely.  
However, contrary to DeAngelo (1981), Dye (1991) posits that the client possesses more 
bargaining power than the incumbent auditor. In auditor-client relationship, both are sole 
seller and sole buyer so that bargaining power rules which party will get the quasi-rents 
from the engagement. If the client has all bargaining power, the incumbent auditor would 
not have incentive to offer a price cut in the initial year, especially lower than its cost. But 
even when the client is free to choose any auditor in the market, the auditor has more 
bargaining power (Kanodia and Mukherji 1994). Specifically, when the client wants to 
keep its incumbent auditor, for example, when the auditor agrees to attest on the client’s 
financial information more optimistic than real, the auditor would offer initial year audit 
fee discounting to be incumbent. However, if outside stakeholders observe the existence of 
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quasi-rents, they would perceive that the financial st tements are less reliable.1 Therefore, 
low-balling only occurs if the auditor’s quasi-rents from future engagements are 
unobservable to outsiders (Dye 1991). 
In any case, the low-balling of audit fees could lead to impaired auditor independence 
because auditors need to keep the client for a longtime to recover initial loss. Thus, 
auditors are more likely to acquiesce to client pressure not to lose the existing clients, 
leading to impaired independence. 
 
2.2 Empirical Studies on Low-balling of Audit Fees 
 
Simon and Francis (1988) show initial year audit fee cutting practices using survey data. 
In addition, Ettredge and Greenberg (1990) and Ghosh and Lustgarten (2006) reconfirm 
the existence of initial engagement fee cutting with more recent data2 nd argue that these 
fee cutting practices are derived from the difference between new auditors and incumbent 
auditors regarding fee-relevant dimensions such as auditors’ class, industry expertise, 
technological efficiency, and the number of auditors’ bidding which differs across 
engagements. Gregory and Collier (1996) also find while involuntary auditor changes are 
related to insignificantly positive increases in fees, voluntary changes are related to 
significantly negative fee reductions, confirming the existence of low-balling. These 
findings suggest that the fee reductions are ascribed to not economies of scale or audit 
scope changes but low-balling to attract new clients. Meanwhile, Craswell and Francis 
(1999) test Dye’s (1991) theory by investigating low-balling in Australia where audit fee 
information has been available since 1970s. They find that initial engagement fee discount 
does not occur in Australia, confirming the Dye’s (1991) argument that the low-balling 
                                                            
1
 Schatzberg and Sevcik (1994) show that auditors deviate from truthful reporting, that is impair 
their independence only when additional future profits exceed the additional cost of misreporting. 
2 Specifically, Ghosh and Lustgarten (2006) find that low-balling occurs more frequently among 
non-Big 4 auditors than Big 4 auditors. This finding suggests that Big 4 auditors try to maintain 
high-quality audit and thus are less likely to compete with other in fees than quality. 
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disappears if the audit fees are publicly disclosed.   
Korean empirical studies also show that initial year audit fee discounts exist in Korea 
(Shin et al. 2007; Park and Lee 2008; Park and Shim 2009; Park et al. 2010; Lee et al. 
2011; Park and Park 2011). It is noteworthy that, unlike the prediction of Dye (1991), the 
initial fee discount prevails even after audit fee information was started to be disclosed 
publicly in Korea. This finding suggests that Korean uditors in general care less for 
auditor reputation or quality than those in other dveloped countries. 
 
2.3 Empirical Studies on Audit Fees and Audit Quality 
 
In general, audit quality is increasing function of audit fee which is the sum of actual 
audit cost and expected legal liability cost (Choi et al. 2008). The audit fee is determined 
by audit hour multiplied by audit fee per hour. Since more audit hour means more efforts 
to perform the audit, higher audit fee usually represents higher audit quality. In fact, Huang 
et al. (2014) find that when there are auditor changes and initial engagement year audit fee 
discount, sanctions against auditors and greater discret onary accruals are more likely. In 
addition, Shin et al. (2007) find that audit quality is generally lower when auditor is in the 
first year of audit engagement relative to the continuing audit, and that the audit quality is 
even lower for firms giving the initial fee discount.1 
However, Hoitash et al. (2007) document a negative association between audit fees and 
audit quality, which are consistent with economic bonding story rather than auditor 
reputation concerns. In addition, Choi et al. (2010) find that audit quality is negatively 
associated with positive abnormal audit fees while it is not significantly associated with 
negative abnormal audit fees. These indicate that too high audit fee leads to impaired audit 
quality due to the economic bonding between the auditor and the client. Thus, in summary, 
                                                            
1
 On the contrary, Deis and Giroux (1996) (Dopuch andKing (1996)) show that initial year audit fee 
discounts increased (did not reduce) audit quality. In addition, Gul et al. (2009) and Park and Park 
(2011) show that the audit quality is not related to low-balling. 
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it is not clear from the findings in prior studies how the audit fees and audit quality is 
related. 
 
2.4 Empirical Studies on Audit Committee Influence 
 
Collier and Gregory (1996) posit that audit committees would be expected to exert a 
following two-way countervailing pressures on total audit fees. First, audit committees 
would be expected to increase audit fees to the extnt that they should improve audit 
quality partly by ensuring audit hour is not reduced. Second, since audit committees would 
be a proxy for the strength of internal controls, firms with audit committees (strong internal 
controls) would pay lower audit fees because it takes less time for auditors to audit clients 
with good internal control system, compared to those without audit committees (weak 
internal controls), ceteris paribus. Empirically, they find that the former force dominates 
the latter, which supports for the argument that at le st audit committees are partially 
effective in preventing audit fee reductions to levels where the audit quality may be 
compromised. 
Abbott et al. (2003) examine the association between audit committee characteristics 
such as audit committee independence, expertise, and activity and audit fees. They 
demonstrate that both audit committee independence a d financial expertise are positively 
associated with audit fees. Assuming that higher audit fee is related to higher audit quality, 
the result indicates that an independent and expert audit committee requires higher audit 
quality and wants external auditor to put more audit efforts. Meanwhile, they find that 
audit committee meeting frequency is not associated with audit fees. In sum, effective 
audit committees could affect the negotiations of audit fees as well as audit scope. In 
addition, audit committees could simultaneously strengthen auditors’ relative bargaining 
position by reducing the overall threat of auditor dismissal during the audit fee negotiations, 
leading to higher audit fees even in the absence of increased audit scope. Chung (2005) 
also investigates the association between audit committee characteristics and audit fees 
using Korean data and finds that audit committee independence and activities are 
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positively associated with audit fees. Moreover, Pak and Shim (2009) show that audit fees 
are negatively associated with the existence of an audit committees and audit committees 
that are more independent, have greater financial and accounting expertise, and meet more 
frequently.1 
Prior literature also examines the effectiveness of an audit committee on improving 
financial reporting quality. For example, Klein (2002) investigates whether board and audit 
committee characteristics are associated with earnings management by the firm and finds 
that abnormal accruals are negatively associated with board or audit committee 
independence. These results indicate that audit committee composition affects a firm’s 
ability to monitor its financial accounting process.  Similarly, Dhaliwal et al. (2010) 
show that audit committee accounting experts who hold fewer directorships, have a lower 
tenure, and are independent have a positive effect on accruals quality. Furthermore, they 
show that the most positive effect on accruals quality is achieved when companies have a 
mix of accounting and finance experts in their audit committees. 
 
 
III. Hypotheses Development 
 
As discussed up to now, even though initial year audit fee discounting is a natural 
consequence of competing auditors and there are several arguments that this practice does 
not impair the audit quality or auditor independence, too much competence leading to 
lower audit fees could impair the audit quality (Shin et al. 2007). At the same time, too 
much of audit fee is also a woe to the audit market and regulators since abnormal high 
audit fees would be derived from the economic bonding between the auditor and the client 
(Choi et al. 2010). In reality, switching auditors is costly and the audit market is not 
perfectly competitive. Therefore, rational audit clents engaging with low-balling initial fee 
                                                            
1
 They classify sample firms as having audit fee discounts when the ratio of the difference between 
the estimated normal audit fee and actual audit fees ov r the estimates exceeds 30%. 
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anticipate that higher audit fees will be charged in subsequent years and low-balling may 
result in a higher average audit fee across total audit engagement years than the normal 
level.  
In particular, in Korea, audit engagements of listed companies should be continued at 
least for three consecutive years to secure auditors’ ndependence according to the Act on 
the External Audit of Stock Corporation. This requirement is called ‘3-year mandatory 
auditor retention.’ Hence, auditor incumbency could be a huge advantage at fee negotiation. 
Taken together, since low-balling is the result of future quasi-rents that sellers expect, 
auditors who offer low-balling is likely to increase subsequent year audit fees to recover 
first year loss or small profit.  
If audit committees expect the initial year audit fee discount will be reversed after the 
initial year because of auditors’ rent extraction behaviors, they would not be tempted with 
discounted audit fees when selecting a new auditor. In addition, they will not accept too 
high audit fees since they anticipate the creation of economic bonding between the auditor 
and the client due to the high level of fees. Thus, we posit that the firms with an effective 
audit committee have smaller or no initial year audit fee discount than those with a less 
effective audit committee.  
There are several aspects that could distinguish effective and ineffective audit 
committees. Following prior literature (e.g., Abbott e  al. 2003; Chung 2005), we focus on 
the audit committee’s independence, expertise, and activities. First, if audit committees are 
independent, they would have less pressure to choose the auditor with fee discounting (less 
pressure in expense) than management and make better judgment on engaging a competent 
auditor (Abbott et al. 2003). In addition, since audit committees that are composed entirely 
of independent directors care more about their reputation and responsibility to protect 
stakeholders’ wealth (Fama and Jensen 1983), they are less likely to engage the auditors 
who offer fee discounting.  
Second, audit committees with finance and accounting expertise would monitor the 
company’s financial related processes and controls better and require the auditor to put 
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more audit efforts (e.g., Abbott et al. 2003; Chung 2005).1 In addition, audit committee 
members with finance and accounting expertise can anticipate that initial year audit fee 
discounting will be reversed in subsequent years and that the auditor would not input 
sufficient audit efforts in the initial year due todiscounted audit fees, which results in 
impaired audit quality. Thus, audit committees with expertise are less likely to expect 
initial year audit fee discounting. However, given that large Korean firms are all required 
to have audit committee members with at least one member with accounting or finance 
expertise,2  empirically, it is not clear whether the mandatory appointment of audit 
committee member plays an effective role.  
Third, the level of audit committee activity is usually measured by the meeting 
frequency of committee. Audit committees more active are more likely to monitor the 
company closely and actively (Abbott et al. 2003). With stronger monitoring, the audit 
committees would require more audit hours and efforts to improve financial reporting 
quality and to mitigate auditing risks.3  
Finally, we add one more audit committee characteristics, average tenure of audit 
committee members, to investigate audit committee eff ctiveness. There are two 
countervailing arguments on the effect of audit committee tenure. In Korea, average audit 
committee members’ tenure is less than three years.4 Considering that audit committee 
meetings are generally held four times a year to review and approve quarterly and annual 
                                                            
1
 DeZoort and Salterio (2001) posit that the members of an audit committee with more experience 
are more likely to understand the risks the auditor faces. 
2
 Korean firms with total assets over 2 trillion won must have at least one audit committee member 
with financial expertise by the Securities and Exchange Law revised in 2003.  
3
  In contrast, there is also a possibility that a frequ nt audit committee meeting means the company 
is under financial constraints or has internal control issues. Thus, it is not clear how the audit 
committee meeting frequency is related to initial audit fee discounts.  
4
 Table 2 shows the mean and median values of average tenure of audit committee members are 
2.84 years and 2.33 years, respectively. 
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financial statements,1 we question whether three-year directorship is enough to understand 
the company’s financial risks and internal controls on financial reporting and to decide the 
reasonable extent of audit. In fact, prior literatue suggests that audit committee members 
with longer tenure would be more informed about the company’s financial reporting and 
internal controls (Hong and Jung 2012; Sharma and Iselin 2012). Therefore, they can make 
better decisions, which can be shown as more stable audit fees over years. In contrast, 
audit committee members with short tenure may not being aware of initial fee discount and 
subsequent fee increase due to limited experience. Otherwise, independent audit committee 
members with longer tenure may build cozy relationship with management leading to 
impaired independence (Sharma and Iselin 2012). Thus, longer audit committee member 
tenure may result in impaired audit quality. Thus, the effect of audit committee tenure is 
not clear.  
In sum, we expect firms with effective audit committees will have less initial year audit 
fee discounting and hypothesize: 
 
H1-1: Audit committees that are composed entirely of independent directors have less 
initial year audit fee discounting. 
 
H1-2: Audit committees that have at least one financial expert have less initial year audit 
fee discounting than those without financial experts. 
 
H1-3: Audit committees that are active have less initial year audit fee discounting. 
 
H1-4: Audit committees on which members have longer average tenure have less initial 
year audit fee discounting. 
 
                                                            
1




  However, the above predictions only hold when Korean audit committee members plays 
its intended monitoring role. If auditor committee m mbers play a ceremonial role only, as 
argued by many critics or media in Korea, it is possible that the characteristics of the 
committee and their interactions with the first year audit indicator variable are not 




IV. Research Design 
 
As in prior literature (Simon and Francis 1988; Craswell et al. 1995; Craswell and 
Francis 1999; Ghosh and Lustgarten 2006), we employ the following regression model to 
examine the effect of audit committee characteristics on audit fees and initial fee discounts: 
 
LNAUDFEEit = β0 + β1LNTotal Assetsit + β2Current Ratioit + β3Current to Total Assetsit  
+ β4Inventory Ratioit + β5Leverageit + β6ROAit + β7Lossit + β8SQSegmentsit  
+ β9Foreign Ownershipit + β10Big4it + β11Non-Audit Feeit + β12IFRSit  
+ β13Firstit + β14Audit Committee Characteristicsit  
+ β15Firstit * Audit Committee Characteristicsit + β16Year Dummies 
+ β17Industry Dummies + εit                                                                                              (1) 
 
where, for client i and in year t : 
LNAUDFEE = natural log of audit fees in thousand won; 
LNTotal Assets = natural log of total assets in thousand won; 
Current Ratio = ratio of current assets to current liabilities; 
Current to Total Assets = ratio of current assets to total assets; 
Inventory Ratio = ratio of inventory to total assets; 
Leverage = ratio of total liabilities to total assets; 
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ROA = ratio of net income to total assets; 
Loss = 1 if a client has negative net income in year t o year t-1, 0 
otherwise; 
SQSegments = square root of the number of business segments; 
Foreign Ownership = proportion of outstanding shares held by foreign investors; 
Big4 = 1 if an auditor is one of the Big 4, 0 otherwise; 
Non-Audit Fee = 1 if an auditor provides non-audit services to a client, 0 
otherwise; 
IFRS   = 1 if  financial statements are prepared by using International  
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), 0 otherwise; 
First = 1 if there exists an auditor turnover in year t, 0 otherwise. 
 
Our independent variable of interest is an interaction variable between First and Audit 
Committee Characteristics, which include Independence, Expertise, SQActivity, and 
SQTenure. First, Independence equals 1 when all of audit committee members are 
independent directors and 0 otherwise. Second, Expertise equals 1 when the audit 
committee has at least one financial expert and 0 otherwise.1  Financial experts are 
classified as audit committee members having work experience as certified public 
accountants, certified tax accountants, chief financial officers, financial controllers, chief 
executive officers from financial institutes, accounting and finance professors, any other 
major accounting position, or any other financial mnagement role. Third, SQActivity is the 
square root of the number of audit committee meetings held during the fiscal year. Finally, 
SQTenure is the square root of the average number of years the audit committee members 
have served as directors of client i during the fiscal year. 
In equation (1), if effective audit committee characteristics restrict auditor’s low-balling 
                                                            
1
 In US, the audit committee of public companies should include at least one member with financial expertis  




behavior, we expect that the interaction terms betwe n first year audit indicator variable 
(First) and audit committee characteristics (Characteristics) have positive coefficients.  
In regards to control variables, following Ghosh and Lustgarten (2006), we include the 
natural log of total assets in thousand won (LNTotal Assets) to control for client size. 
Current Ratio, Current to Total Assets, Inventory Ratio, ROA, Leverage, LOSS, and 
SQSegments are used to control for audit risk and complexity. We also add Foreign 
ownership as a control variable since foreign owners are more likely to ask companies to 
have effective corporate governance and to improve financial reporting quality (e.g., Park 
et al. 2004; Kim and Bae 2007; Hong and Jung 2012). In addition, we include Big4 to 
control for the effect of differentiation of audit quality on audit fees (Choi et al. 2010). 
Finally, we control for the existence of non-audit service fees (Non-Audit Fee) which can 
affect fees for audit services (Palmrose 1986; Park et al. 2003), and the IFRS adoption 
(IFRS) which increases audit hour and audit fees (Lee et al. 2012). 
In this model, we expect the coefficient on First is negative but the coefficient on the 
interaction term between First and Audit Committee Characteristics is positive, suggesting 
effective audit committees have less initial year audit fee discounts. 
 
 
V. Sample Construction and Descriptive Statistics 
 
5.1 Sample Construction 
 
In Korea, public companies whose asset size over 2 trillion won have been required to 
establish an audit committee since 2000. 1 In addition, audit fees in the last 3 fiscal years 
have been disclosed in the annual report since 1999. Thus, our sample consists of 
December fiscal year-end non-financial Korean listed companies in the Korea Composite 
                                                            
1
 The audit committee must be composed of at least 3 directors. At least two third of them must be independent 
by the Securities and Exchange Law revised in 2000. 
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Stock Price Index (KOSPI) market which have the audit committee during 2000 to 2012.1 
Thus, the firms without audit committee are removed from the sample. 
We hand collect audit committee data from the company’s annual reports and obtain 
financial data from the Korea Investors Service-Value (KIS-VALUE). Audit fees, business 
segment, and foreign ownership data are taken from the TS2000 database. Then, we 
exclude delisted firm-year observations and those with qualified audit opinion. We 
winsorize audit committee activity and tenure variables at the 1st and 99th percentile to 
alleviate the potential effect of outliers. These result in 1,429 firm-year observations for the 
fee discounting model and 1,040 firm-year observations for the fee change model.   
 
<Table 1> Descriptive Statistics (N=1,429) 







LNAUDFEE 12.246 12.278 0.887 11.513 12.835 
LNTotal Assets 21.365 21.651 1.569 20.130 22.465 
Current Ratio 1.529 1.100 3.575 0.766 1.583 
Current to Total Assets 0.358 0.347 0.174 0.239 0.474 
Inventory Ratio 0.083 0.069 0.073 0.028 0.115 
Leverage 0.500 0.533 0.198 0.348 0.638 
ROA 0.037 0.038 0.120 0.010 0.073 
LOSS  0.248 0.000 0.432 0.000 0.000 
SQSegments  1.571 1.414 0.584 1.000 2.000 
Foreign Ownership 0.187 0.144 0.171 0.040 0.292 
Big4 0.872 1.000 0.334 1.000 1.000 
Non-Audit Fee 0.540 1.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 
IFRS 0.280 0.000 0.449 0.000 1.000 
First 0.155 0.000 0.362 0.000 0.000 
Independence 0.801 1.000 0.399 1.000 1.000 
                                                            
1
 Our sample which spans the period from 2000 to 2012 would provide more supporting evidence 
for the effect of audit committee characteristics on audit fees than prior studies which cover a 
shorter period given that such fee discounts existed during 2007 to 2010 (Desir et al. 2014) but 
not during 2005-2006 in US (Huang et al. 2009). 
17 
 
Expertise 0.540 1.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 
Activity 5.312 4.000 4.619 3.000 6.000 
SQActivity 2.147 2.000 0.839 1.732 2.449 
Tenure 2.836 2.333 1.596 1.667 3.667 
SQTenure 1.621 1.528 0.457 1.291 1.915 
The variable definitions are as follows: 
LNAUDFEE = natural log of audit fees in thousand won; 
LNTotal Assets = natural log of total assets in thousand won; 
Current Ratio = ratio of current assets to current liabilities; 
Current to Total 
Assets 
= ratio of current assets to total assets; 
Inventory Ratio = ratio of inventory to total assets; 
Leverage = ratio of total liabilities to total assets; 
ROA = ratio of net income to total assets; 
Loss = 1 if a client has negative net income in year t or year t-1, 0 otherwise; 
SQSegments = square root of the number of business segments; 
Foreign Ownership = proportion of outstanding shares held by foreign investors; 
Big4 = 1 if an auditor is one of the Big 4, 0 otherwise; 
Non-Audit Fee = 1 if an auditor provides non-audit services to a client, 0 otherwise; 
IFRS = 1 if  financial statements are prepared by using International Financial 
Reporting Standards(IFRS), 0 otherwise; 
First = 1 if there exists an auditor turnover in year t, 0 otherwise; 
Independence = 1 if all of audit committee members are independent irectors , 0 otherwise; 
Expertise = 1 if an audit committee has at least one financial expert, 0 otherwise; 
SQActivity = square root of the number of audit committee meetings held during the 
fiscal year; 
SQTenure = square root of the average number of years the audit committee members 





<Table 2> Correlation Matrix (N=1,429) 
          (1)   (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
(1) LNAUDFEE  1.00                 
(2) LNTotal Assets  0.87   1.00                 
(3) Current Ratio -0.12  -0.13   1.00                
(4) Current to Total 
Assets 
-0.18  -0.26   0.08   1.00               
(5) Inventory Ratio -0.21  -0.23  -0.01   0.48   1.00              
(6) Leverage 0.16   0.22  -0.28  0.08   0.05   1.00             
(7) ROA 0.07   0.08   0.02   0.07   0.04  -0.23   1.00            
(8) Loss -0.03  -0.03  -0.06 -0.10  -0.07   0.30  -0.38    1.00           
(9) SQSegments 0.20   0.19  -0.10  -0.10 -0.05  0.21  -0.07    0.07   1.00          
(10) Foreign 
Ownership 
 0.51  0.50 -0.01 -0.03  0.01 -0.18  0.24  -0.21 -0.03 1.00        
(11) Big4 0.35   0.31  0.01  -0.08 -0.13  -0.04   0.05   -0.02  -0.03   0.22   1.00        
(12) Non-Audit Fee 0.36   0.32  -0.07  -0.03  -0.10  0.09   0.06   -0.04   0.18   0.24   0.13  1.00      
(13) IFRS 0.01  -0.03   0.09   0.08   0.01  -0.10 -0.02   0.09  -0.26  -0.08  0.07 -0.14   1.00      
(14) First -0.07  -0.02  -0.01 -0.02   0.01   0.04   0.01    0.01   0.02  -0.05   0.04  -0.09 -0.14  1.00     
(15) Independence 0.41   0.39  -0.12 -0.18  -0.19   0.08   0.02   -0.03  0.13  0.19   0.22  0.19   0.04  -0.03   1.00    
(16) Expertise 0.16  0.11  0.00  0.03  0.03 -0.01  0.05   0.03  0.01  0.15  0.10  0.07 -0.01  0.01  0.16 1.00  
(17) SQActivity 0.05  0.03  0.02  -0.00   0.06  -0.02   0.02    0.00   0.02   0.03  -0.04 -0.08  -0.03   0.02  -0.08   0.05   1.00  
(18) SQTenure 0.15   0.09 -0.02  -0.05   0.01  -0.02  -0.06   -0.05 -0.01   0.09   0.02   0.04   0.05  -0.04   0.08  -0.00  -0.04 
This table shows the Pearson correlation coefficients which in bold indicate significance at p ≤ 0.10. See <Table 1> for variable definitions.
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5.2 Descriptive Statistics   
 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for our final s mple (N=1,429). The natural 
logarithm of audit fees in thousand won (LNAUDFEE) has a mean (median) value of 
12.246 (12.278) and a standard deviation of 0.887. The mean (median) value of audit fees 
is 317.16 (215.00) million won and, on average, 15.5% of our samples changed an auditor. 
In regards to audit committee characteristics, on average, 80.1% of our samples have an 
independent audit committee (Independence) and 54.0% of them had at least one financial 
expert on the audit committee (Expertise). The mean and median values of audit 
committee meeting frequency (Activity) are 5.31 times per year and 4.00 times per year, 
respectively. The mean (median) value of average tenure of audit committee members 
(Tenure) is 2.84 (2.33) years. We omit the explanations for other variables because they 
are self-evident. In Table 1, we fail to find any unusual distributions. 
Table 2 presents the Pearson correlations between our variables, which offer preliminary 
evidence that there exists initial year audit fee discounts and that effective audit 
committees lead to higher audit fees. LNAUDFEE is significantly and negatively 
correlated with First (correlation = -0.07), but significantly and positively correlated with 
Audit Committee Characteristics: Independence (correlation = 0.41), Expertise (correlation 
= 0.16), SQActivity (correlation = 0.05), and SQTenure (correlation = 0.15). We fail to find 
any unusual correlation in Table 2 and thus omit discussion for other variables. 
 
 
VI. Empirical Results 
 
6.1 Main Regression Results 
 
Table 3 reports the results from estimating Equation (1). Model (1) of Table 3 presents 
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the results including all of Audit Committee Characteristics: Independence, Expertise, 
SQActivity, and SQTenure, while Models (1-1) through (1-4) show the results including 
only one of the Audit Committee Characteristics individually. We find that the explanatory 
powers (R2) of the model, as reported in the bottom row of Table 3, are very high, reaching 
0.80. It implies that our models explain the determinants of audit fees reasonably well.  
As in prior literature (e.g., Shin et al. 2007; Park nd Lee 2008), all of the Models report 
that the coefficient on First is significantly negative, suggesting initial year udit fee 
discounting exists in Korea. For example, in Model 1, the coefficient on First is -0.288 and 
significant at 5% level (t-value = -2.25).  
In addition, consistent with Chung (2005), the coefficients on Independence and 
SQActivity are significantly positive while the coefficient on Expertise is positive but 
insignificant, indicating an independent and diligent audit committee requires increased 
audit coverage from an external auditor, reflected in higher audit fees (Abbott et al. 2003). 
The coefficient on SQTenure is also positive but insignificant. These findings enerally 
support the findings in prior literature that audit committee with good governance 
characteristics require more thorough audit. 
The coefficients on the interaction terms between First and the Audit Committee 
Characteristics are generally positive but all insignificant. In sum, these findings generally 
do not support the predictions of H1. 
The coefficients on a number of our control variables are generally significant and 
consistent with the findings in prior literature. Specifically, firms with large size, higher 
ratio of current assets to total assets, lower profitability, more business segments, higher 
foreign ownership, and that have Big 4 auditor are ssociated with higher audit fees. 
Moreover, firms to whom non-audit services are provided by external auditors and whose 
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1.348       
(5.1) 
***  1.389 
(5.29) 
***  1.353 
(5.16) 
***  1.343 
(5.11) 




-0.288         
(-2.25) 
**  -0.108          
(-1.87) 
*  -0.126       
(-3.09) 
***  -0.217       
(-2.95) 




0.052             
(1.67) 
*  0.053 
(1.70) 
*        
First *  
Independence 
0.014              
(0.21) 
 -0.001        
(-0.02) 
       
Expertise 
0.028              
(1.23) 
      0.031   
(1.41) 
     
First *  
Expertise 
0.026              
(0.47) 
   
0.028     
(0.52) 
     
SQActivity 
0.026             
(1.95) 
*      0.024 
(1.80) 
*    
First *  
 SQActivity 
0.049               
(1.55) 
     0.049   
(1.57) 
   
SQTenure 
0.026              
(1.04) 
       0.018   
(0.70) 
 
First *  
SQTenure 
0.031                
(0.57) 





0.445                
(46.10) 
***  0.450                
(46.92) 
***  0.453                
(48.36) 
***  0.450                
(47.79) 




-0.004               
(-1.53) 
 -0.004       
(-1.51) 
 -0.005       
(-1.70) 
*  -0.005      
(-1.73) 





0.249                 
(3.21) 
***  0.237 
(3.05) 
***  0.233 
(3.01) 
***  0.226 
(2.93) 




-0.371                    
(-2.09) 
**  -0.299          
(-1.69) 
*  -0.347           
(-1.97) 
* *  -0.387      
(-2.20) 




-0.061                
(-0.92) 
 -0.059             
(-0.90) 
 -0.054         
(-0.81) 
 -0.052        
(-0.79) 




-0.206                   
(-2.27) 
**  -0.210              
(-2.33) 
**  -0.219              
(-2.43) 
* *  -0.212           
(-2.36) 




0.026                 
(0.96) 
 0.026           
(0.99) 
 0.021          
(0.78) 
 0.023             
(0.84) 




0.097                  
(5.16) 
***  0.094 
(5.01) 
***  0.096 
(5.13) 
***  0.099 
(5.28) 





0.339                 
(4.32) 
***  0.346 
(4.42) 
***  0.334     
(4.25) 
***  0.353 
(4.52) 




0.166                   
(5.13) 
***  0.161 
(4.97) 
***  0.164 
(5.09) 
***  0.171 
(5.34) 
***  0.169 
(5.26) 
***  
Non-Audit Fee 0.104                     ***  0.099 ***  0.102 ***  0.106 ***  0.102 ***  
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(4.82) (4.60) (4.72) (4.93) (4.74) 
IFRS 
0.371                    
(4.32) 
***  0.383 
(4.46) 
***  0.373 
(4.34) 
***  0.381 
(4.45) 





Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
N 1,429 1,429 1,429 1,429 1,429 
Adjusted R2 0.831 0.830 0.830 0.831 0.830 
1) *, ** , and ***  denote significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
2) See <Table 1> for variable definitions. 
3) Equation (1) used for the regression analyses is: 
    LNAUDFEEit = β0 + β1LNTotal Assetsit + β2Current Ratioit + β3Current to Total Assetsit  
+ β4Inventory Ratioit + β5Leverageit + β6ROAit + β7Lossit + β8SQSegmentsit 
+ β9Foreign Ownershipit + β10Big4it + β11Non-Audit Feeit + β12IFRSit + β13Firstit 
+ β14Audit Committee Characteristicsit  
+ β15Firstit * Audit Committee Characteristicsit  
+ β16Year Dummies+ β17Industry Dummies + εit                                                                     (1) 
 
 
  To further examine the combined effects of audit committee characteristics on initial year 
audit fee discounting, we create several composite m asure of audit committee 
characteristic: Audit CommitteeN. : Audit Committee1, Audit Committee2, Audit 
Committee3, and Audit Committee4. The Audit Committee1 variable has a value of 1 if one 
of the values of the four criteria for Audit Committee Characteristics (i.e., Independence, 
Expertise, Activity, and Tenure) is 1 (Independence and Expertise) or above median value 
(Activity and Tenure), and 0 otherwise. Similarly, Audit Committee2 variable has a value of 
1 if any two of the values of the four criteria for Audit Committee Characteristics (i.e., 
Independence, Expertise, Activity, and Tenure) is 1 (Independence and Expertise) or above 
median value (Activity and Tenure), and 0 otherwise. The Audit Committee3 (Audit 
Committee4) variable has a value of 1 if three (four) of the values of the four criteria for 
Audit Committee Characteristics (i.e., Independence, Expertise, Activity, and Tenure) is 1 
(Independence and Expertise) or above median value (Activity and Tenure), and 0 
otherwise. Thus, Audit Committee1, Audit Committee2, and Audit Committee3 equal 1 
when an audit committee has any of one, two, and three good audit committee 
23 
 
characteristics, and 0 otherwise, respectively. Alternatively, Audit Committee4 equals 1 
when an audit committee satisfies all four good governance criteria, Independence, 
Expertise, Activity, and Tenure.  
Table 4 shows the criteria for Audit Committee Characteristics used in creating Audit 
Committee variables. Specifically, we classify the final sample into four groups, reflected 
in Audit Committee variables, with the median value of each Audit Committee 
Characteristics variable. Based on the variable definitions, we select observations that 
meet the criteria. For example, as reported in Table 4, we identify 188 observations that 
meet any one of four governance criteria (Audit Committee1 = 1). Among 1,429 total 
number of observations, we find that 1,389 (= 188 + 402 + 514 + 285) observations are 
equipped with at least one of the four good governance criteria. Thus, the remaining 40 (= 
1,429 – 1,389) observations do not have audit committee that meet any one of the four 
criteria. 
 
<Table 4>  
The Criteria for Audit Committee Characteristics and  
the Definition of Audit Committee Variables 
Variables Independence Expertise Activity Tenure 
Criteria 
1 1 
4 or more 
meeting 
2.3 year or longer 
0 0 
Less than 4 
meeting 
Shorter than 2.3 
year 
     
    Number of 
observations 
Audit Committee1 = 1 if an audit committee has any of one good                    188 
audit committee characteristics, 0 otherwise; 
 
Audit Committee2 = 1 if an audit committee has any of two good                    402 
audit committee characteristics, 0 otherwise; 
 
Audit Committee3 = 1 if an audit committee has any of three good                    514 




Audit Committee4 = 1 if an audit committee satisfies all the good                         285 
audit committee characteristics, 0 otherwise. 
This upper part of table presents the criteria for Audit Committee Characteristics: Independence, 
Expertise, Activity, and Tenure used in creating Audit CommitteeN (i.e., Audit Committee1, Audit 
Committee2, Audit Committee3, and Audit Committee ) variables. The lower part of the table 




Then, we include them in Equation (1) instead of Audit Committee Characteristics and 
repeat our tests. We perform this analysis because these four characteristics are potentially 
correlated each other (although the correlations are not too high as reported in Table 2) and 
the correlation may result in the bias in our estima ed results. In addition, it is not clear 
whether the effect of audit committee characteristics prevail when only some of the four 
criteria are met, or whether all of the criteria are met.  
Table 5 reports the results from estimating Equation (1) using Audit CommitteeN 
variables instead of Audit Committee Characteristics. As our expectations, the coefficient 
on First is significantly negative and the coefficients on Audit CommitteeN variables are 
positive. In particular, the coefficient on Audit Committee4 (0.136) is significant. These 
findings generally support the findings tabulate in Table 3 that audit fee low-balling exists 
in Korea and firms with good governance characteristics pay higher audit fees.  
In addition, we find that the four interaction terms between First and Audit CommitteeN 
are all positive and significant. For example, the co fficient on First*  Audit Committee1 is 
0.586 which is significant at 1% level (t-value = 3.07). Interestingly, we note that the 
coefficients on First*  Audit Committee1, First*  Audit Committee2, First*  Audit 
Committee3, and First*  Audit Committee4 are all similar in magnitude and significant. The 
findings suggest that meeting different number of god governance criteria is not matter. 
As long as firms meet any one of the criteria, the eff ct of the governance is very similar. 
Thus, it suggest that four governance aspects play similar roles in helping auditors to 
expand audit scope and thus limit the audit fee low-balling. Put differently, these results 
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suggest that the audit committees which have at leas one of good governance criteria are 
effective in preventing low-balling of audit fees and that the degree of satisfying good 
audit committee characteristics is not crucial to the effectiveness of audit committees in 
avoiding initial year audit fee discounting.1 
 
<Table 5> 
The Combined Effect of Audit Committee Characteristics on  
Initial Year Audit Fee Discounts 
Variables Coeff.        t-stat. 
Intercept  1.374***    5.16 
First -0.751***  -4.22 
Audit Committee1  0.077***    1.12 
First * Audit Committee1  0.586***     3.07 
Audit Committee2  0.053***    0.80 
First * Audit Committee2  0.685***    3.70 
Audit Committee3  0.098***    1.46 
First * Audit Committee3  0.715***    3.90 
Audit Committee4  0.136***    1.95 
First *Audit Committee4  0.558***    2.94 
                                                            
1 Specifically, we report the test results on the comparisons of the magnitude of coefficients as 
follows:  
Audit Committee1 = Audit Committee2 (p-value = 0.518)  
Audit Committee1 = Audit Committee3 (p-value = 0.573)  
Audit Committee1 = Audit Committee4 (p-value = 0.152)  
Audit Committee2 = Audit Committee3 (p-value = 0.110)  
Audit Committee2 = Audit Committee4 (p-value = 0.012)  
Audit Committee3 = Audit Committee4 (p-value = 0.193)  
First * Audit Committee1 = First * Audit Committee2 (p-value = 0.238)  
First * Audit Committee1 = First * Audit Committee3 (p-value = 0.113)  
First * Audit Committee1 = First * Audit Committee4 (p-value = 0.768)  
First * Audit Committee2 = First * Audit Committee3 (p-value = 0.653)  
First * Audit Committee2 = First * Audit Committee4 (p-value = 0.123)  
First * Audit Committee3 = First * Audit Committee4 (p-value = 0.049)  
 
These findings reveal that magnitudes of the coeffici nts are not different in most cases. 
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LNTotal Assets  0.447***  47.11 
Current Ratio -0.005***   -1.61 
Current to Total Assets  0.256***    3.31 
Inventory Ratio -0.357***   -2.04 
Leverage -0.048***   -0.73 
ROA -0.208** *   -2.32 
Loss  0.021***    0.79 
SQSegments  0.101***    5.39 
Foreign Ownership  0.345***    4.43 
Big4  0.167***    5.22 
Non-Audit Fee  0.102***    4.78 
IFRS  0.368***    4.30 
Industry Dummies Included 
Year Dummies Included 
N 1,429 
Adjusted R2 0.832 
1) *, ** , and ***  denote significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
2) See <Table 1> for variable definitions and <Table 4> for the definitions of Audit CommitteeN 
variables. 
3) Equation (1) used for the regression analyses is: 
LNAUDFEEit = β0 + β1LNTotal Assetsit + β2Current Ratioit + β3Current to Total Assetsit  
+ β4Inventory Ratioit + β5Leverageit + β6ROAit + β7Lossit + β8SQSegmentsit  
+ β9Foreign Ownershipit + β10Big4it + β11Non-Audit Feeit + β12IFRSit + β13Firstit 
+ β14Audit CommitteeNit + β15Firstit * Audit CommitteeNit + β16Year Dummies 
 + β17Industry Dummies + εit                                                        (1) 
 
6.2 Sensitivity Analyses 
 
We conduct several sensitivity analyses to make surthe robustness of our findings as 
follows. First, we investigate an alternative measure of Expertise. Specifically, we create 
Expertise Ratio, the ratio of the number of audit committee members with financial 
expertise to the number of directors on the audit committee. Table 6 shows the results 
using Expertise Ratio. The results are similar to primary results in which there exists low-
balling of audit fees in Korea and an independent and diligent audit committee is effective 
in negotiating audit fees. In particular, diligent audit committees do not have a significant 
audit fee increase in subsequent engagement years. We omit the results for control variable 
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for simplicity purpose. They are not qualitatively different from those tabulate previously. 
Thus, we fail to find the evidence that our insignificant results for the variable is due to any 
measurement errors.1 
 
<Table 6> An alternative measure of Expertise 
Variables 














1.333           
(5.08) 
***  -0.223                
(-1.46) 
 -0.233             
(-1.60) 
 
First -0.290           
(-2.25) 
**  -0.120              
(-3.16) 
***  0.209                
(2.24) 
**  0.060 
(2.20) 
**  
Independence 0.056          
(1.80) 
*    0.026               
(1.17) 
   
First * Independence 
0.018          
(0.27) 
   0.026                
(0.53) 
   
Expertise Ratio 0.076          
(1.76) 
*  0.075                 
(1.73) 
*  -0.055                
(-1.65) 
*  -0.048              
(-1.45) 
 
First * Expertise Ratio 
0.051          
(0.46) 
 0.047                
(0.42) 
 0.168                
(2.11) 
**  0.159 
(1.99) 
**  
SQActivity 0.026         
(1.95) 
*    0.005                   
(0.48) 
   
First * SQActivity 
0.050         
(1.59) 
   -0.049                 
(-2.15) 
**    
SQTenure 0.029         
(1.12) 
   -0.040                 
(-1.90) 
*    
First * SQTenure 
0.032         
(0.58) 
   -0.045                 
(-1.11) 
   
N 1,429 1,429 1,040 1,040 
Adjusted R2 0.831 0.830 0.222 0.213 
1) *, ** , and ***  denote significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
                                                            
1 Because most of the firms have only 1 member of expert, it is possible that the ratio does not 
adequately measure the differing level of the expertise. In case that there is only 1 expert member in 
the committee, the ratio is decided by the number of audit committee members.  
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2) Expertise Ratio refers to the ratio of the number of audit committee members with financial 
expertise to the number of directors on the audit committee. See <Table 1> for the other variable 
definitions.  
3) Equation (1) used for the regression analyses in Model 1 is: 
 LNAUDFEEit = β0 + β1LNTotal Assetsit + β2Current Ratioit + β3Current to Total Assetsit  
+ β4Inventory Ratioit + β5Leverageit + β6ROAit + β7Lossit + β8SQSegmentsit  
+ β9Foreign Ownershipit + β10Big4it + β11Non-Audit Feeit + β12IFRSit + β13Firstit  
+ β14Audit Committee Characteristicsit  
+ β15Firstit * Audit Committee Characteristicsit  
+ β16Year Dummies+ β17Industry Dummies + εit                                                                   (1) 
4) To conserve space, we report the coefficients and significances for the variables of interests only. 
 
Second, since Korean firms with total assets over 2 trillion won must have at least one 
audit committee member with financial expertise by the Securities and Exchange Law 
revised in 2003, we restrict the final sample to thse with total assets amounted to less than 
2 trillion won and repeat the tests. These are the firms that are not mandated to have audit 
committee with at least one expertise. Although they are untabulated, the empirical results 
are qualitatively similar to those tabulated previously.  
   Third, four SQActivity and SQTenure variable, we use an indicator variable based on the 
median values (1 if the value is greater than median and 0 otherwise) instead of a 
previously used continuous variables. The results are qualitatively similar to those 
previously tabulated.  
 
 
VII. Summary and Conclusions 
 
We investigate the effect of audit committee characteristics on low-balling of audit fees 
using 1,429 firm-year observations during the 2000-2 12 in Korea. Given that the audit 
committee is crucial to corporate governance (e.g., BRC 1999) and that audit fees are one 
of the mechanism to ensure high audit quality, examining the effect of audit committee 
characteristics on audit fees is important. Our empirical results suggest that low-balling of 
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audit fees exist in Korean audit market and audit committee independence and meeting 
frequency are positively associated with audit fees. In particular, audit committees with 
frequent meetings prevent audit fee discounts in the first engagement year, suggesting that 
diligent audit committee plays an important role to maintain high audit quality. Finally, we 
find that the audit committees which satisfy at least one of good governance criteria are 
effective in preventing initial year audit fee discounts.  
Our empirical findings are subject to some limitations. Specifically, we only focus on 
the observations of Korean firms listed in the KOSPI Market, and thus the findings could 
not be generalizable to all Korean firms with audit committees and other countries. 
However, our findings should be of significant interest to policy-makers, regulators, 
academicians, managers, investors, and the other interested parties. Given that no prior 
studies examine the association between four audit committee characteristics and initial 
year audit fee discounts, this study provides valuable insights. In addition, given the recent 
regulation on independent directors in financial firms, this study should be of interest to 
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본 연구의 목적은 특정한 특성을 갖고 있는 감사위원회가 초도감사 보수 할인 
현상을 효과적으로 기피할 수 있는지 조사하는 것이다. 효과적인 감사위원회는 높은 
품질의 감사를 위하여 감사 초년도 감사인의 감사보수 할인 제의를 받아들이지 않을 
것으로 예상된다. 본 연구는 감사위원회가 갖고 있는 특성 중 감사위원회의 질에 
영향을 미칠 것으로 여겨지는 특성을 감사위원회의 독립성, 감사위원회내의 
재무전문가 포함 여부, 감사위원회 개최 횟수, 감사위원회 위원의 평균 재임 기간 등 
네 가지로 하여 각각의 특성이 초도감사보수 할인에 미치는 영향을 살펴보았다. 
선행연구와 마찬가지로 본 연구에서는 한국 감사 시장에서 초도감사보수 할인이 
이루어지고 있음을 재 확인하였으며 감사위원회의 독립성과 활동성은 감사 보수와 
양의 관계를 가지고 있는 것으로 나타났다. 특히, 잦은 감사위원회 회의 개최가 초도 
감사보수 할인을 억제하는 것으로 보아 활동적인 감사위원회는 감사품질 유지에 
중요한 역할을 하는 것으로 보인다. 마지막으로, 위 네 가지 감사위원회 특성 중 
적어도 한 가지 감사위원회 특성을 만족하는 감사위원회는 초도감사보수 할인을 
효과적으로 회피하는 것으로 나타났다. 주요 회귀분석에 대한 민감도 분석을 실시한 
결과 감사위원회의 활동성은 감사보수와 양의 관계를 갖고 있음을 확인할 수 있었다.   
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